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Abstract
We initiate the study of a newmodel of supervised learning under privacy constraints. Imagine
a medical study where a dataset is sampled from a population of both healthy and unhealthy
individuals. Suppose healthy individuals have no privacy concerns (in such case, we call their
data “public”) while the unhealthy individuals desire stringent privacy protection for their data.
In this example, the population (data distribution) is a mixture of private (unhealthy) and public
(healthy) sub-populations that could be very different.
Inspired by the above example, we consider a model in which the population D is a mixture
of two sub-populations: a private sub-population Dpriv of private and sensitive data, and a public
sub-population Dpub of data with no privacy concerns. Each example drawn from D is assumed
to contain a privacy-status bit that indicates whether the example is private or public. The goal
is to design a learning algorithm that satisfies differential privacy only with respect to the private
examples.
Prior works in this context assumed a homogeneous population where private and public
data arise from the same distribution, and in particular designed solutions which exploit this
assumption. We demonstrate how to circumvent this assumption by considering, as a case study,
the problem of learning linear classifiers in Rd. We show that in the case where the privacy status
is correlated with the target label (as in the above example), linear classifiers inRd can be learned,
in the agnostic as well as the realizable setting, with sample complexity which is comparable to
that of the classical (non-private) PAC-learning. It is known that this task is impossible if all the
data is considered private.
1 Introduction
Despite the remarkable progress in privacy-preserving machine learning powered by the rigorous
framework of differential privacy (DP) [DMNS06], the current state of the art has several limitations.
Most of the existing works on differentially private learning follow a conventional model, where the
entirety of the input dataset to the learning algorithm is assumed to be sensitive and private, and
hence, requires protection via the stringent constraint of DP. Unfortunately, this conservative ap-
proach has fundamental limitations that manifest in many problems. For example, learning even
simple classes of functions (e.g., one-dimensional thresholds over R) is provably impossible under
that stringent model [BNSV15, ALMM18] even though such classes are trivially learnable without
privacy constraints. More recent works [BNS13, BTT18, ABM19, NB20, BCM+20] have consid-
ered a more relaxed model, where the input dataset is made up of two parts: a private sample (as in
the conventional model), and a “public” sample that entails no privacy constraints. In this model,
the algorithm is required to satisfy DP only with respect to the private sample. Despite of the good
news brought by these works showing the possibility of circumventing some of the aforementioned
limitations by harnessing a limited amount of public data, all these works make the strong assump-
tion that both the private and public samples come from the same population (i.e., they arise from
the same distribution). This can limit the practical value of these results in many real-life scenarios,
where private and public data are naturally distinct.
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Indeed, for a data record, the attribute of being sensitive can be strongly correlated with the
value of that record (i.e., the realization of the feature-vector and the label). For example, imagine
a scenario where a bank wants to predict the credit-worthiness of applicants for a credit card. To do
this, a training sample is drawn from a population of individuals with good and bad credit scores.
Suppose individuals with good credit score have no privacy concerns in sharing their data with the
bank (and hence, their data can be viewed as “public”), while those with bad credit score are con-
cerned about what the study may reveal about them to third parties and understandably so, because
they do not want such information to impact their chances in future opportunities. In this example,
the population is a mixture of two very different groups: a sub-population with a good credit score
(public sub-population), and a sub-population with bad credit score (private sub-population).
In this work, we introduce a new model for differentially private learning in which a learning
algorithm has access to a mixed dataset of private and public examples that arise from possibly
different distributions. The algorithm is required to satisfy DP only with respect to the private
examples. More specifically, in our model, the underlying population (data distribution) D is a
mixture of two possibly different sub-populations: a private sub-population Dpriv of sensitive data,
and public sub-population Dpub of data that is deemed by its original owner to have no risk to
personal privacy. We assume that each example drawn from the mixture D has a “privacy flag”
which is a binary label to indicate whether the example is private or public. As usual in the statistical
learning framework, we do not assume the knowledge of D or any of the sub-populations (or their
respective weights in the mixture).
Contributions
• Introducing PPM model: We formally describe the basic model of supervised learning from
mixtures of private and public populations, and define the corresponding class of learning algo-
rithms, which we refer to as Private-Public Mixture (PPM) learners.
• Learning Halfspaces: Although the first quick impression about the model might be that it is a
bit too general to allow for interesting results beyond what is covered by the conventional model
of DP learning, we demonstrate that this is not the case and prove the first non-trivial result
under this model in the context of learning halfspaces (linear classifiers) in Rd (for any d ≥ 1).
We give a construction of a PPM learner for this problem in the case where the privacy status
is correlated with the target label, as in the credit-worthiness example above. Curiously, our
PPM learner is improper: it outputs a hypothesis (classifier) that can be described by at most d
halfspaces. We hence derive upper bounds on the sample complexity of this problem in both the
realizable and agnostic settings. In particular, we show that halfspaces in Rd can be learned in
the aforementioned PPM model up to (excess) error α using≈ d
2
α total examples in the realizable
setting, and using≈ d
2
α2 total examples in the agnostic setting. As noted earlier, in the conventional
model, where all the examples drawn from D are considered private, this class cannot be learned
(even for d = 1).
Techniques: The idea of our construction for learning halfspaces goes as follows. First, we use the
public examples to define a finite family of halfspaces C˜pub. Then, we employ a useful tool from
convex geometry known as Helly’s Theorem [Hel23] to argue the existence of a collection of at
most d halfspaces in C˜pub whose intersection is disjoint from the ERM halfspace (the halfspace with
smallest empirical error with respect to the entire set of training examples). This implies that there is
a hypothesis (described by the intersection of at most d halfspaces from C˜pub) whose empirical error
is not larger than that of the ERM halfspace. Hence, we reduce our learning task to DP learning
of a finite class G that contains all possible intersections of at most d halfspaces from C˜pub. We
note that the latter task is feasible since G is a finite class [KLN+08]. The description here is rather
simplified. The actual construction and our analysis entail more intricate details (e.g., we need to
carefully analyze the generalization error since the class G itself depends on the public part of the
training set). One clear aspect from the above description is that our construction is of an improper
learner since, in general, the output hypothesis is given by the intersection of at most d halfspaces.
Devising a construction of a proper learner for this problem is an interesting open question.
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Related work: As mentioned earlier there have been some works that studied utilizing public data
in differentially private data analysis. In particular, the notion of differentially private PAC learning
assisted with public data was introduced by Beimel et al. in [BNS13], where it was called “semi-
private learning.” They gave a construction of a learning algorithm in this setting, and derived upper
bounds on the private and public sample complexities. The paper [ABM19] revisited this problem
and gave nearly optimal bounds on the private and public sample complexities in the agnostic PAC
model. The work of [BCM+20] introduced the related, but distinct, problem of differentially private
query release assisted by public data, and gave upper and lower bounds on private and public sample
complexities. All these prior works assumed that the private and public examples arise from the
same distribution (i.e., Dpriv = Dpub), and their constructions particularly exploited this assumption.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to consider a formal model for learning from
mixtures of private and public populations that does not entail this assumption, and our construction
for halfspaces demonstrates that this assumption can be circumvented. It is also worth pointing
out that, unlike the aforementioned prior work, a PPM learner is only assumed to have access to
examples from the mixture distribution D rather than access to examples from each of Dpriv and
Dpub. Hence, unlike prior work, our construction does not require certain number of examples from
each sub-population; it only requires a certain total number of examples from the mixed population.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some notation, state some basic concepts from learning theory, and
describe some geometric properties we use throughout the paper.
Notation: For n ∈ N, we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. We use standard notation from
the supervised learning literature (see, e.g. [SSBD14]). Let X denote an arbitrary domain (that
represents the space of feature vectors). Let Y = {0, 1}. A function h : X → Y is called a
concept/hypothesis. A family of concepts (hypotheses) C ⊆ YX is called a concept/hypothesis class.
A learning algorithm, receives as input i.i.d. samples generated from some arbitrary distribution D
over X × Y , and outputs a hypothesis h ∈ YX .
Expected error: The expected/population error of a hypothesis h : X → Y with respect to a
distribution D over X × Y is defined by err(h;D) , E
(x,y)∼D
[1 (h(x) 6= y)].
A distribution D is called realizable by C if there exists h∗ ∈ C such that err(h∗;D) = 0. In this
case, the data distribution D over X ×Y is completely described by a distributionDX over X and a
true labeling concept h∗ ∈ C.
Empirical error: The empirical error of an hypothesis h : X → {0, 1} with respect to a labeled
dataset S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} will be denoted by êrr (h;S) ,
1
n
∑n
i=1 1 (h(xi) 6= yi) .
The problem of minimizing the empirical error on a dataset (i.e. outputting an hypothesis in the class
with minimal error) is known as Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM).
We next define the geometric concepts we use in this paper.
Halfspaces and Hyperplanes: For w = (w0, w1, . . . , wd) ∈ Rd+1, let hw denote the halfspace
defined as hw , {x ∈ Rd :
∑d
i=1 wixi ≥ w0}. We will overload the notation and use h to denote
both the halfspace and the corresponding binary hypothesis defined as the indicator function of the
halfspace. In particular, whenever we write h(x), we would be referring to h as the binary hypothesis
associated with the halfspace h, namely h(x) , 1 (x ∈ h). A pair of halfspaces hw and h−w will
be loosely referred to as “opposite” halfspaces. A pair of opposite halfspaces hw and h−w intersect
in the hyperplane hpw , {x ∈ Rd :
∑d
i=1 wixi = w0}. A finite set S ⊂ R
d is said to support a
halfspace hw if S is contained in the hyperplane hpw.
Affine subspace: A non-empty subset Aff ⊆ Rd is an affine subspace, if there exists a u ∈ Aff
such that Aff − u = {x − u | x ∈ Aff} is a linear subspace of Rd. Moreover, we say that Aff
is k-dimensional affine subspace, 1 ≤ k ≤ d, if the corresponding linear subspace Aff − u is
k-dimensional.
Since differential privacy is central to this work, we conclude this section by stating its definition.
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Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [DKM+06, DMNS06, DR14]). Let ǫ, δ > 0. A (randomized)
algorithm M : {X × Y}n → R is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all pairs of datasets S, S′ ∈
{X × Y} that differ in exactly one entry, and every measurableO ⊆ R, we have:
Pr (M(S) ∈ O) ≤ eǫ · Pr (M(S′) ∈ O) + δ.
3 Model and Definitions
In this paper, we consider a model of privacy-preserving learning, where the input dataset is a mix-
ture of private and public examples. We call such model Private-Public Mixture (PPM) learning.
We view each example in the input dataset as a triplet comprised of a feature vector x ∈ X , a target
label y ∈ Y , and a privacy status bit p ∈ P , {priv, pub}. The privacy status is a bit that describes
whether the example is private (p = priv) and hence requires protection via differential privacy, or
public (p = pub) and hence does not entail any privacy concerns. In this paper, the privacy status
is used only to distinguish between the private and public portions of the dataset. We stress that the
goal is to learn how to classify the target label (and not the privacy bit).
In our formulation, the training examples are i.i.d. from a distribution D over Z , X × Y × P .
Hence, the distributionD is a mixture of a public sub-populationDpub , DX×Y|pub and private sub-
population Dpriv , DX×Y|priv, where DX×Y|p denotes the conditional distribution of the (x, y) ∈
X × Y given a privacy-status bit p ∈ P . A sample S ∼ Dn is a mixture of private and public
examples that can be distinguished using the privacy-status bit. Hence, we can partition the dataset
S into: a private dataset Spriv ∈ (X × Y)npriv and a public dataset Spub ∈ (X × Y)npub , where
npriv + npub = n. We note that Spriv ∼ D
npriv
priv and Spub ∼ D
npub
pub .
The PPM Learning Model: A PPM learning model is described by the following components:
(i) a distribution D over X × Y × P ; (ii) a dataset of n i.i.d. examples from D; (iii) a loss function
ℓ : Y × Y → R+, which we fix to be the binary loss function, i.e., ℓ(yˆ, y) , 1(yˆ 6= y), yˆ, y ∈ Y;
and (iv) a PPM learning algorithm, which we define below:
Definition 3.1 ((ǫ, δ, n)-PPM Learning Algorithm). Let ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N. An (ǫ, δ, n)-PPM
learning algorithm is a randomized mapA : (X × Y × P)n → YX that maps datasets of size n (of
private and public examples) to binary hypotheses such that for any npub ≤ n and any realization
of the public portion of the input dataset Spub ∈ (X × Y)
npub , the induced algorithm A(·, Spub) is
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private (w.r.t. the private portion of the input dataset).
Expected error of a PMM algorithm A: Let D˜ be a distribution over X × Y . Let hˆ denote the
hypothesis produced by A on input sample S of size n. The expected error of a PPM algorithm
w.r.t. D˜ is defined as err(A(S); D˜) = E
(x,y)∼D˜
[
1(hˆ(x) 6= y)
]
. Note that the distribution here is only
over X × Y since, as mentioned earlier, the goal is to learn how to classify the target label and not
the privacy status. Namely, D˜ is the distribution that is obtained from the original distribution D by
marginalizing over the privacy status bit p.
Generally speaking, the goal in PPM learning is to design a PPM algorithm whose expected error
is as small as possible (with high probability over the input i.i.d. sample and the algorithm’s internal
randomness).
As stated, the above model does not specify how we quantify the learning goal over the choice
of the distribution and the sample size. This is done to maintain flexibility in defining the learning
paradigm based on the PPM model. Indeed, one can make different choices about such quantifiers
and their order, which would result in different modes of learnability. One standard paradigm, which
we will adopt in Section 4, is to assume that the learning algorithm has access to a fixed hypothesis
class C ⊆ YX and require that the algorithm attains small excess error, i.e., require that the expected
error incurred by the algorithm is close to the smallest expected error attained by a hypothesis in C
(as in (agnostic) PAC learning). However, we still need to specify how we will quantify this desired
goal over the distribution D. One possibility is to insist on uniform learnability; namely, require
that we design a PPM algorithm that given a sufficiently large sample is guaranteed to have a small
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excess error (not exceeding a prespecified level) w.r.t. all distributionsD overX ×Y×P . However,
this route will lead us back to the conventional DP learning since the family of all distributions D
clearly subsumes those distributions where all examples are private. We thus propose a meaningful
alternative, where we fix a specific conditional distribution DP |X×Y of the privacy status bit p ∈ P
given labeled example (x, y) ∈ X × Y and quantify over all distributions D˜ over X × Y .
Privacy model DP |X×Y: The conditional distribution DP|X×Y is given by{
P [p = b | (x, y)] : b ∈ P , (x, y) ∈ X × Y
}
.
In other words, it can be seen as a mapping taking an example (x, y) to the conditional distribution
of its privacy bit, P [p = ·|x, y]. We refer to DP|X×Y as the privacy model. Such conditional distri-
bution captures how likely a labeled example (x, y) to be sensitive (from a privacy perspective). As
discussed earlier, in many practical scenarios, the attribute of being sensitive can strongly depend on
the realization of the data record.
Label-determined privacy model: A special case of the above definition is when the privacy status
is perfectly correlated with the target label (as in the examples discussed in the introduction and the
abstract). Namely, in this case, we have p = priv ⇐⇒ y = 1 with probability 1 (or, p = pub ⇐⇒
y = 1 with probability 1). We refer to this privacy model as label-determined.
Next, we formally define one possible class of PPM learners based on the discussion above.
Definition 3.2 ((α, β, ǫ, δ)-PPM learner for a class C w.r.t. a privacy model DP |X×Y). Let C ⊆ Y
X
be a concept class, let DP |X×Y be a privacy model, and let α, β, ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1). A randomized
algorithm A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ)-PPM learner for C w.r.t. DP |X×Y with sample size n if the following
conditions hold:
1. A is an (ǫ, δ, n)-PPM learning algorithm (see Definition 3.1).
2. For every distribution D˜ over X × Y , given a dataset S ∼ Dn where D = D˜ × DP |X×Y ,
A outputs a hypothesis hˆ such that, with probability at least 1 − β (over S ∼ Dn and the
internal randomness of A),
err
(
hˆ; D˜
)
≤ min
h∈C
err
(
h; D˜
)
+ α.
When the first condition is satisfied with δ = 0 (i.e., pure differential privacy), we refer to A as
(α, β, ǫ)-PPM learner for C w.r.t. DP |X×Y .
In the special case of label-determined privacy model, we say that A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ)-PPM
learner for a class C assuming label-determined privacy model.
4 Learning Halfspaces
We consider the problem of PPM learning for one of the most well-studied tasks in machine learning,
namely, learning halfspaces (linear classifiers) in Rd. We focus on the case of label-determined
privacy model defined earlier; that is, we consider the case where the privacy-status bit is perfectly
correlated with the target label. In particular, a 1-labeled data point is considered to be a private data
point and a 0-labeled data point is a public data point. We give a construction for a PPM learner
for halfspaces in this case in both the agnostic and realizable settings. Our construction outputs a
hypothesis with excess true error α using an input sample of size O˜
(
d2
ǫα
)
in the realizable setting,
and a sample of size O˜
(
d2 max
(
1
α2 ,
1
ǫα
))
in the agnostic setting. Our algorithm is an improper
learner; specifically, the output hypothesis is given by the intersection of at most d halfspaces.
Relaxations to the label-determined privacy model: Since perfect correlation between the privacy
status and the target label might be a strong assumption to make in some practical scenarios, it is
important for us to point out that such strict correlation is not necessary. In particular, our results
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(with exactly the same construction) still hold under either one of the following two relaxations to
this assumption: (i) when the privacy status is only sufficiently correlated with the output label (in
this case, the same construction will yield essentially the same accuracy since the impact of this
relaxation on the excess error will be small); or (ii) when only the private examples have the same
target label while the set of public examples can have both labels (in fact, our analysis will be exactly
the same in this case). However, to emphasize the conceptual basis of our construction and maintain
clarity and simplicity of the analysis, we opt to present the results for the simpler model that assumes
perfect correlation.
Overview
The input to our private algorithm is a dataset S ∈ (X ×Y ×P)n. The dataset S is partitioned into:
Spriv ∈ (X×Y)npriv (private dataset) and Spub ∈ (X×Y)npub (public dataset) using the privacy-status
bit in P , as described in Section 3, where npriv + npub = n. The main idea of our algorithm is to
construct a family of halfspaces in Rd, denoted by C˜pub, using the (unlabeled) public data points,
and then restrict the algorithm to a finite hypothesis class G made up of all intersections of at most
d halfspaces from C˜pub. That is, each hypothesis in the finite hypothesis class G is represented by an
intersection of at most d halfspaces from the family C˜pub. Using Helly’s Theorem [Hel23, Rad21],
we can show that G will contain one hypothesis whose error is comparable to that of the ERM
halfspace. Hence, given the finite hypothesis class G, we construct a private learner that outputs a
hypothesis from G via the exponential mechamishm [MT07]. Our construction is described formally
in Algorithm 2.
First, let’s start by describing the construction of C˜pub and the finite hypothesis class G.
Let S˜pub ∈ Xnpub denote the unlabeled version of the public portion Spub of the input dataset.
The family of halfspaces C˜pub is constructed as follows. Let
W , {Ŝ ⊆ S˜pub : |Ŝ| ≤ d}.
Namely, W is a collection of all the subsets of S˜pub of at most d points. Note that the size of
such collection is |W| = O(ndpub). For each Ŝ ∈ W , we find one arbitrary halfspace in R
d that is
supported by Ŝ, and its corresponding opposite halfspace. We add these two halfspaces to C˜pub. In
addition to C˜pub, we also define the affine subspace Aff that is spanned by the points in S˜pub (where
the notion of an affine subspace is as defined in Section 2). Note that, when the points of S˜pub are
in general position, Aff is trivially taken to be the entire Rd. The set Aff is merely needed when
the public data points lie in a lower dimensional affine subspace since in this case, we can simply
restrict ourselves to the intersections of the halfspaces in C˜pub with Aff. Finally, we get a family of
halfspaces C˜pub whose size is |C˜pub| = 2 |W| = O(ndpub), and one additional set Aff. We remark that
if there are no public examples in the dataset, (i.e., S˜pub = ∅), then we simply return the empty set,
i.e., C˜pub = ∅. We formally describe the construction of C˜pub and Aff in Algorithm 1 (denoted by
AConstrHalf).
Effective hypothesis class: In our main algorithm ALearnHalf (Algorithm 2 below), we construct
a finite hypothesis class G using C˜pub described above. Each hypothesis in G corresponds to the
intersection of at most d halfspaces in the collection C˜pub and the affine subspace Aff . Hence, it
follows that |G| ≤
(|C˜pub|
≤ d
)
= O(|C˜pub|d) = O(2d nd
2
pub). Note that we consider the intersection of at
most d halfspaces, so G is assumed to also contain a hypothesis that corresponds to the empty set ∅,
which assigns label 1 to all points in Rd (according to our definition in Step 8 of Algorithm 2).
The privacy guarantee of ALearnHalf is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 (PrivacyGuarantee ofALearnHalf). For any realization of the privacy-status bits (p1, . . . , pn)
∈ Pn, and for any realization of Spub constructed in Steps (2 -4) of ALearnHalf (Algorithm 2),
ALearnHalf is ǫ-differentially private (w.r.t. the private portion of the input dataset).
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Algorithm 1 AConstrHalf : Construction of the family C˜pub halfspaces
Input: Dataset: Spub ∈ (Rd × Y)npub
1: Let S˜pub be the unlabeled version of Spub.
2: Initialize C˜pub = ∅.
3: LetW = {Ŝ ⊆ S˜pub : |Ŝ| ≤ d}.
4: for every Ŝ ∈ W : do
5: Find a halfspace h ∈ Rd that is supported by Ŝ, and its corresponding opposite halfspace h−.
{The notion of opposite halfspaces is defined in Section 2.}
6: Add h, h− to C˜pub.
7: Let Aff be the affine subspace spanned by S˜pub.
8: Output {C˜pub, Aff}.
Algorithm 2 ALearnHalf : PPM Learning of Halfspaces
Input: Class of halfspaces in Rd: C; Labeled dataset: S = {(x1, y1, p1), . . . , (xn, yn, pn)} ∈
(Rd × Y × P)n, Privacy parameter: ǫ
1: Initialize Spub ← ∅, S
′ ← ∅, G ← ∅
2: for i = 1, . . . , n do
3: if pi = pub then
4: Add (xi, yi) to Spub.
5: {C˜pub, Aff} ← AConstrHalf(Spub).
6: for i = 1, . . . , n do
7: Add (xi, yi) to S
′ {S′ consists of all the (x, y) pairs of S}
8: For every j ∈ [d], and every collection of distinct halfspaces h1, . . . , hj ∈ C˜pub, add a hypothesis
g to G, where g is defined as:
g(x) , 1
(
x /∈
(
j⋂
i=1
hi ∩ Aff
))
, x ∈ Rd.
9: Use the exponential mechanism with inputs S′, G, privacy parameter ǫ, and a score function
q(S′, g) , −êrr(g;S′) to select a hypothesis ĝ from G.
10: Output ĝ.
Proof. For any Spub ∈ (X ×Y)npub , the family of halfspaces C˜pub and the affine subspace Aff (Step 5
in Algorithm 2) are constructed using only the public part of the dataset S (and hence, so is G). The
private part of S is invoked in Step 9, which is an instantiation of the exponential mechanism. Thus,
the proof follows directly from the privacy guarantee of the exponential mechanism [MT07].
Next, we turn to the analysis of the (excess) error of ALearnHalf . Let hERMS′ denote the ERM
halfspace with respect to the dataset S′; that is, hERMS′ = argmin
h∈C
êrr(h;S′). We will first show that
the expected error of the output hypothesis of ALearnHalf is close to that of hERMS′ . Then, we derive
explicit sample complexity bounds for ALearnHalf in the realizable and agnostic settings.
The first main step in our analysis is to show the existence of a hypothesis g∗ ∈ G whose
empirical error is not larger than the empirical error of hERMS′ . Let S˜pub \ h
ERM
S′ , {x ∈ S˜pub : x /∈
hERMS′ }. First, we consider the corner case where S˜pub \ h
ERM
S′ = ∅. In this case, all public examples
are incorrectly labeled (i.e., assigned label 1) by hERMS′ . Thus, the hypothesis g
∗ ∈ G we are looking
for is simply the empty hypothesis, which assigns label 1 to all points in Rd. Indeed, in such case
the empirical error of g∗ cannot be larger than that of hERMS′ since g
∗ correctly labels all the private
examples and is consistent with hERMS′ on all the public examples.
Thus, in the remainder of our analysis, we will assume w.l.o.g. that S˜pub \ hERMS′ 6= ∅. We first
state some useful facts from convex geometry.
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For any finite set T ⊂ Rd, we use V(T ) to denote the convex hull of all the data points in T . Note
that V(T ) is a convex polytope that is given by the intersection of at mostO(|T |d) halfspaces. Hence,
V(S˜pub \hERMS′ ) is a convex polytope that contains all the public data points that are labeled correctly
by hERMS′ . Moreover, V(S˜pub \ h
ERM
S′ ) is given by the intersection of a sub-collection of halfspaces
in C˜pub and Aff. (As mentioned earlier, intersection with Aff is needed only when all the public data
points lie in a lower dimensional affine subspace. In this case, the convex hull V(S˜pub \ hERMS′ ) is a
“flat” set that lies in this affine subspace.) Thus, we can make the following immediate observation:
Observation 4.2. Let h1, . . . , hv be halfspaces in C˜pub such that
( v⋂
i=1
hi
)
∩ Aff = V(S˜pub \ hERMS′ ).
Then
(( v⋂
i=1
hi
)
∩ Aff
)
∩ hERMS′ = ∅.
A key step in our analysis relies on an application of a basic result in convex geometry known as
Helly’s Theorem, which we state below.
Lemma 4.3 (Helly’s Theorem restated [Hel23, Rad21]). Let N ∈ N. Let F = {C1, C2, . . . , CN}
be a family of convex sets in Rd. Suppose we have
N⋂
i=1
Ci = ∅, then there exists a collection
Ci1 , . . . , CiK , whereK ≤ d+ 1, such that Ci1 ∩ . . . ∩ CiK = ∅.
Combining Observation 4.2 and Lemma 4.3, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 4.4. There exists a sub-collection of sets T ⊆ C˜pub ∪ {Aff}, where |T | ≤ d, such that( ⋂
h∈T
h
)
∩ hERMS′ = ∅.
Proof. By Lemma 4.3 andObservation 4.2, there exists a sub-collectionT ′ ⊆ {h1, . . . , hv,Aff, hERMS′ }
of size |T ′| ≤ d + 1 such that the intersection of the sets in T ′ is empty (where h1, . . . , hv are
the halfspaces in Observation 4.2). Observe that necessarily hERMS′ ∈ T
′ since
( v⋂
i=1
hi
)
∩ Aff =
V(S˜pub \ hERMS′ ) 6= ∅. Therefore T = T
′ \ {hERMS′ } gives the desired collection.
Define g∗(x) , 1
(
x /∈
⋂
h∈T
h
)
, x ∈ Rd, where T is the collection of at most d sets whose
existence is established in Corollary 4.4. Note that g∗ ∈ G. Given this definition of g∗, we note that
all points in S′ that are labeled correctly by hERMS′ are also labeled correctly by g
∗. Indeed, for any
private (i.e. 1-labeled) data point x that hERMS′ labels correctly (i.e. x ∈ h
ERM
S′ ), we have x /∈
( ⋂
h∈T
h
)
by Corollary 4.4. Hence, g∗ labels x correctly. Conversely, for any public (i.e., 0-labeled) data point
x that hERMS′ labels correctly (i.e. x /∈ h
ERM
S′ ), we must have x ∈ V(S˜pub \ h
ERM
S′ ) ⊆
( ⋂
h∈T
h
)
, where
the last step follows from the definition of the collection T in the proof of Corollary 4.4. Hence, g∗
also labels x correctly. This clearly implies that the empirical error of g∗ cannot exceed the empirical
error of hERMS′ . We formally state this implication in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5. There exists a hypothesis g∗ ∈ G that satisfies
êrr(g∗;S′) ≤ êrr(hERMS′ ;S
′).
Next, using the properties of the exponential mechanism, we can show that with high probability
the empirical error of output hypothesis ĝ of ALearnHalf is close to that of g∗.
Lemma 4.6. Let α, β, ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Let S′ ∈ (Rd × Y)n be any realization of the dataset. For
n = O
(
d2 log(d/ǫα)+log(1/β)
ǫ α
)
, with probability at least 1 − β (over the randomness Step 9 of
ALearnHalf), ALearnHalf outputs a hypothesis ĝ ∈ G that satisfies:
êrr (ĝ;S′)− êrr(g∗;S′) ≤ α.
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Proof. Note that |G| = O(2d nd
2
pub), and that the score function for the exponential mechanism is
−êrr(h;S′), whose global sensitivity is 1/n.
By standard accuracy guarantees of exponential mechanism [MT07], it follows that an input
sample size
n = O
(
1
ǫα
(
log (|G|) + log
(
1
β
)))
is sufficient to ensure that, w.p. ≥ 1− β (over the randomness Step 9), we have
êrr (ĝ;S′) ≤ min
g∈G
êrr (g;S′) + α,
which implies that êrr (ĝ;S′) ≤ êrr (g∗;S′) + α.
Substituting the size of G, it follows that
n = O
(
1
ǫα
(
log (|G|) + log
(
1
β
)))
= O
(
1
ǫα
(
log
(
2d nd
2
pub
)
+ log
(
1
β
)))
= O
(
1
ǫα
(
d2 log
(
d
ǫα
)
+ log
(
1
β
)))
.
By combining the two previous lemmas, we directly reach the following claim that asserts that
the empirical error of the output hypothesis of ALearnHalf is close to that of the ERM halfspace
hERMS′ ∈ C.
Claim 4.7 (Excess Empirical Error of ALearnHalf). Let α, β, ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Let S′ ∈ (Rd × Y)n be any
realization of the dataset. For n = O
(
d2 log(d/ǫα)+log(1/β)
ǫ α
)
, with probability at least 1 − β (over
the randomness Step 9 of ALearnHalf), ALearnHalf outputs a hypothesis ĝ ∈ G that satisfies:
êrr (ĝ;S′)− êrr(hERMS′ ;S
′) ≤ α.
Now the remaining ingredient in our analysis is to show that the generalization error ofALearnHalf
is also small. In fact, we will show that this is indeed the case for any algorithm that outputs a
hypothesis in G. We observe that each hypothesis in G is an intersection of at most d halfspaces in
C˜pub (possibly restricted to a lower dimensional affine subspace), and each one of these halfspaces
is represented by at most d points from the input dataset (Step 5 in Algorithm 1). Hence, by using
standard sample compression bounds [LW86, SSBD14], we can derive a bound on the generalization
error of any algorithm that outputs any hypothesis in G.
Lemma 4.8 (Sample Compression bound restated [LW86, SSBD14]). Let k be an integer and let
B : (X × Y)k → G be a mapping from sequences of k examples to the hypothesis class G. Let
A : (X × Y)n → G be a learning rule that takes as input a dataset S = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)),
and returns a hypothesis such that A(S) = B((xi1 , yi1), . . . , (xik , yik)) for some set of indices
(i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [n]k. Then for any distribution D˜ over X × Y , with probability at least 1 − β (over
S ∼ D˜n), we have:∣∣∣err(A(S); D˜)− êrr(A(S);S)∣∣∣ ≤√êrr(A(S);S)4k log(n/β)
n
+
8k log(n/β)
n
+
2k
n
.
Now we have all the ingredients to state and prove sample complexity bounds for our construc-
tion in both the realizable and agnostic settings. In the following statements, note that we already
proved the privacy guarantee ofALearnHalf in Lemma 4.1, and so we only focus on proving the sample
complexity bounds.
Theorem 4.9 (PPM learning of halfspaces in the realizable case). Let α, β, ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Assuming
realizability, and assuming label-determined privacy model,ALearnHalf (Algorithm 2) is an (α, β, ǫ)-
PPM learner for halfspaces in Rd with input sample size:
n = O
(
d2 log(d/ǫα) + log(1/β)
ǫ α
)
.
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Proof. Let D˜ be any distribution over X × Y . Suppose S′ ∼ D˜n (where S′ is a dataset in Step 7 of
Algorithm 2). Note that by Claim 4.7, we get that w.p. ≥ 1 − β/2 (over randomness in Step 9 of
Algorithm 2)
êrr (ĝ;S′)− êrr(hERMS′ ;S
′) = êrr (ĝ;S′) ≤
α
2
as long as n = O
(
d2 log(d/ǫα)+log(1/β)
ǫ α
)
, where here we used the fact that êrr(hERMS′ ;S
′) = 0 since
this is the realizable setting.
Note that Lemma 4.8 (together with the argument before the statement of the lemma) immedi-
ately yields a bound on the generalization error of ALearnHalf (with k = d2 in the statement of the
lemma). Namely, with probability≥ 1−β/2 (over the choice of S′ ∼ D˜n and randomness in Step 9
of Algorithm 2), we have:
|err(ĝ; D˜)− êrr(ĝ;S′)| ≤
√
êrr(ĝ;S)
4d2 log(2n/β)
n
+
8d2 log(2n/β)
n
+
2d2
n
.
Now, using the bound on êrr(ĝ;S′) above and for n = O
(
d2 log(d/ǫα)+log(1/β)
ǫ α
)
, we conclude that
w.p. ≥ 1− β, (over S′ ∼ D˜n and the randomness in ALearnHalf), we have: err
(
ĝ; D˜
)
≤ α.
Theorem 4.10 (PPM learning of halfspaces in the agnostic case). Let ǫ, α, β ∈ (0, 1). Assuming
label-determined privacy model,ALearnHalf (Algorithm 2) is an (α, β, ǫ)-PPM learner for halfspaces
in Rd, with input sample size
n = O
((
d2 log
(
d
ǫα
)
+ log(
1
β
)
)
max
(
1
α2
,
1
ǫ α
))
.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4.9, with probability ≥ 1 − β/4 (over the randomness in Step 9
of ALearnHalf), we have:
êrr (ĝ;S′)− êrr(hERMS′ ;S
′) ≤
α
4
(1)
as long as n = O
(
d2 log(d/ǫα)+log(1/β)
ǫ α
)
. As before, Lemma 4.8 implies that with probability
≥ 1− β/4 (over the randomness in S′ and in ALearnHalf), we have
|err(ĝ; D˜)− êrr(ĝ;S′)| ≤
8d2 log(4n/β)
n
+
2d2
n
.
Hence, for n = O
(
d2 log(d/α)+log(1/β)
α2
)
, with probability≥ 1− β/4, we have:
|err(ĝ; D˜)− êrr(ĝ;S′)| ≤ α/4, (2)
Moreover, by standard uniform convergence bounds [SSBD14], for n = O(d log(1/α)+log(1/β)α2 ),
with probability≥ 1− β/2 (over S′ ∼ D˜n), we have:
|err
(
hERMS′ ; D˜
)
− êrr
(
hERMS′ ;S
′
)
| ≤ α/4 (3)
err
(
hERMS′ ; D˜
)
−min
h∈C
err(h; D˜) ≤
α
4
(4)
Finally by combining (1)-(4), and by the triangle inequality and the union bound, we conclude
that for n = O
((
d2 log
(
d
ǫα
)
+ log( 1β )
)
max
(
1
α2 ,
1
ǫ α
))
, with probability ≥ 1 − β (over the
randomness in S′ and ALearnHalf), we have err
(
ĝ; D˜
)
−min
h∈C
err(h; D˜) ≤ α.
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